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5ec64acd06 fix[docs]: clarify framing of the tool project
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- correct tool positioning -- explain intended use cases without getting
  into too much detail
- some fact-checking -- shared proc and IPC namespaces claim is totall
  bogus
- document the tools this flake is based on, and explain the exposure
  surface for each
- remove some explanations that were relevant in a context of the old
  flake version -- old version is not published and will not be
  observable to the user, so it must not be mentioned
- more laid-back and grounded documentation style: the intended audience
  are engineers like myself -- not an LLM, not an investor

tag: deslop
2026-05-20 05:20:37 +01:00
4d5033b001 ench: simplified NIX_CONFIG appending
my assumption here is -- nix doesn't care about the newlines in its
config, so I would prefer it to cope with a double newline, as it
drastically simplifies the `NIX_CONFIG` handling:
- no obscure append guard
- no double escaped newlines
- shorter code lines in general

tag: deslop
2026-05-20 05:05:31 +01:00
f93f12cfe6 fix[tests]: fixed the checks output 2026-05-20 04:24:59 +01:00
2f4c5fa6c2 [flake.lock] 2026-05-20 04:23:59 +01:00
4 changed files with 87 additions and 43 deletions

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@ -1,49 +1,50 @@
# unsafe-cell # Brief
A `jail-nix` container that shares user namespace and grants all capabilities (the "unsafe" part), packaging a command into a self-contained executable ("cell"). It provides nix daemon passthrough, configurable networking, and filesystem isolation — enough to run agentic workloads without the friction of full containerization. `unsafe-cell` is designed with following workloads in mind:
- share a cache/binary store with the host
- share a configuration with the host
- allow limited internet access (to a set list of domains)
- jailed program might misbehave -- host must be protected from _accidental_ damage
## Capabilities So this cell aims to prevent malfunction, not malice; for example: current design shares a nix daemon with the host -- a malicious code could easily exploit the build pipeline to dos, mine crypto or circumvent the web proxy. However, this kind of malfunction is extremely unlikely happen _accidentally_, while benefits of sharing the nix store with host are self-explanatory.
Shares user/id mappings 1:1 with the host. All kernel capabilities granted. No PID namespace isolation — host PID 1 visible inside. New mount namespace with only explicitly bound paths. Example use-cases:
- trusted CI job container
Nix daemon access via read-only bind of host store (`/nix/store`) and daemon socket (`/run/nix`). Nix config and experimental features (`nix-command`, `flakes`) set inside the jail. Binary substitution enabled. - agentic runtime (like `opencode`, for instance)
Network access is always proxied through tinyproxy with an isolated network namespace (no network routes inside the jail). A socat pair forwards TCP through a Unix socket onto tinyproxy. An optional tinyproxy filter file controls allowed domains; defaults to allow-all (`.*`).
Working directory bind-mounted at a configurable host path. Optional log directory bind.
Entrypoint runs the command derivation supplied via the `command` parameter. `PATH` includes `nix`, `coreutils`.
## Parameters ## Parameters
`command` (`pkgs -> derivation`): Builds the jailed entrypoint. Receives nixpkgs. - `command` (`pkgs -> derivation`): a function to build the cell entrypoint from `nixpkgs` instantiation
- `worktreePath` (string): host path to bind as `/home/cell/worktree` inside the jail. Use this parameter to expose jailed processes primary worktree (like a repo you work on)
- `extraCombinators` (`jail-nix -> list`, default `_: []`): a function to produce additional [`jail.nix` combinators](https://alexdav.id/projects/jail-nix/combinators) you want the jail to have.
- `tinyproxyFilter` (string or null): Path to a tinyproxy filter file. `null` means "allow all", non-`null` should contain a regex list of the allowed domains. Uses [`tinyproxy`](https://tinyproxy.github.io/) (with your filter as a white-list!).
- `logDir` (string or null): directory to bind for log output. `null` means using the jail tempdir (wherever `mktemp` creates it).
- `nixDaemonSocket` (string, default `"/var/nix/daemon-socket"`): host path to nix daemon socket directory (contains `socket`).
`worktreePath` (string): Host path to bind as `/home/cell/worktree` inside the jail. Required, no default. NOTE: if you want to pass some truly special arguments to `bwrap`, see `unsafe-add-raw-args` jail.nix combinator -- an escape hatch for adding bare os args for the `bwrap` process.
NOTE: for now, the host is expected to have a nix daemon socket. To make the cell work, at the bare minimum, you should make up a socket and point `nixDaemonSocket` to it -- cell will connect `socat` to it, but won't actually communicate with the other side, for as long as you don't use `nix` inside the jail.
`extraCombinators` (`jail-nix -> list`, default `_: []`): jail-nix combinators appended to the default set. ## Capabilities
`tinyproxyFilter` (string or null): Path to a tinyproxy filter file. `null` = default allow-all filter (`.*`); non-null = use the specified filter file. - nix daemon access:
- read-only bind of host store (`/nix/store`)
- bind of the daemon socket (`/run/nix`)
- nix client config to silence experimental feature warnings (`nix-command`, `flakes`)
- nix client substitutions enabled to allow binary cache usage (client controls that, for some reason?)
- network:
- http proxied through `tinyproxy`, with optional filter
- isolated network namespace with no interfaces
- workdir bind-mounted at a configurable host path
- optional log directory bind
`logDir` (string or null): Directory to bind for log output. `null` = use jail tempdir (`$JD`). planned:
- spawning a personal dockerd (blocked by some annoying stuff inside `bwrap`)
- support for MITM docker image cache (could be implemented now, but is useless without a personal dockerd)
`nixDaemonSocket` (string, default `"/var/nix/daemon-socket"`): Host path to nix daemon socket directory (contains `socket`). NOTE: unfortunately, outward communication with protocols other than HTTP(S) is not supported. Any celled app failing to interpret `{HTTP{,S},NO}_PROXY` envvars, is also likely to misbehave.
## Implicit assumptions ## Usage example
`mkCell` builds its output for every system in `systems.flakeExposed`. Requires `nixpkgs` and `jail-nix` as flake inputs. See `tests.nix`.
The nix daemon socket path is assumed to be a **directory** containing a `socket` entry — the `NIX_REMOTE` env var always resolves `/run/nix/socket` regardless of `nixDaemonSocket`. Will probably add my `opencode` run script, once it's complete.
`/nix/store` is assumed present and readable on the host. `NIX_PATH` hardcoded to `/home/cell/.nix-defexpr/channels`.
`NIX_CONFIG` unconditionally overrides host nix config — forces `nix-command`, `flakes`, and `substitute = true`.
Host-side packages required at nixpkgs evaluation time: `socat`, `coreutils`, `nix`, `iproute2`, `gawk`, `tinyproxy`.
`worktreePath` is resolved relative to the host-script's CWD at runtime (shell expansion applies).
The default combinator set does not include SSL certificates, app config/state directories, nix registry mapping, nix config files, or secret tokens — these must be supplied by the consumer via `extraCombinators`.
The host script always creates `$JD` (temp dir) with tinyproxy config, SSL overlay dirs, and Unix socket — all cleaned up on exit. The SSL overlay dirs are created but unused (dead code from original hardcoded version).
No IPC namespace isolation — inherits from host.

41
flake.lock generated Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
{
"nodes": {
"jail-nix": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1772137954,
"narHash": "sha256-h4MGNbOo7L3RHi4uNFmsg5g17/DHXEfnv/xiG6BrNFQ=",
"owner": "~alexdavid",
"repo": "jail.nix",
"rev": "42b355c38ca63dab4904acc5c0d95f17954a8c9b",
"type": "sourcehut"
},
"original": {
"owner": "~alexdavid",
"repo": "jail.nix",
"type": "sourcehut"
}
},
"nixpkgs": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1778869304,
"narHash": "sha256-30sZNZoA1cqF5JNO9fVX+wgiQYjB7HJqqJ4ztCDeBZE=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "d233902339c02a9c334e7e593de68855ad26c4cb",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"id": "nixpkgs",
"type": "indirect"
}
},
"root": {
"inputs": {
"jail-nix": "jail-nix",
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
}
}
},
"root": "root",
"version": 7
}

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{ {
description = "unsafe-cell - isolated environment with trusted nix store access"; description = "unsafe-cell - a reasonably-isolated environment";
inputs = { inputs = {
nixpkgs.url = "nixpkgs"; nixpkgs.url = "nixpkgs";
@ -146,7 +146,12 @@
SOCAT_PID=$! SOCAT_PID=$!
trap "${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/rm -rf $JD; ${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/kill $PROXY_PID $SOCAT_PID" EXIT trap "${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/rm -rf $JD; ${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/kill $PROXY_PID $SOCAT_PID" EXIT
export NIX_CONFIG="''${NIX_CONFIG:+$NIX_CONFIG$'\n'}extra-experimental-features = nix-command flakes"$'\n'"substitute = true"
export NIX_CONFIG="
''${NIX_CONFIG:-}
extra-experimental-features = nix-command flakes
substitute = true"
${jailed}/bin/unsafe-cell ${jailed}/bin/unsafe-cell
''; '';
in in
@ -163,7 +168,7 @@
system: system:
let let
pkgs = nixpkgs.legacyPackages.${system}; pkgs = nixpkgs.legacyPackages.${system};
test-names = builtins.attrNames self.checks.${system}.test; test-names = builtins.attrNames (builtins.removeAttrs self.checks.${system} [ "all" ]);
in in
{ {
test-logs = { test-logs = {
@ -173,7 +178,7 @@
failed=0 failed=0
for test in ${builtins.concatStringsSep " " test-names}; do for test in ${builtins.concatStringsSep " " test-names}; do
echo "=== $test ===" echo "=== $test ==="
if nix build ".#checks.${system}.test.$test" -L --no-link 2>&1; then if nix build ".#checks.${system}.$test" -L --no-link 2>&1; then
echo "=== PASS: $test ===" echo "=== PASS: $test ==="
else else
echo "=== FAIL: $test ===" echo "=== FAIL: $test ==="

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@ -382,8 +382,5 @@ nixpkgs.lib.genAttrs
''; '';
in in
{ tests // { inherit all; }
inherit all;
test = tests;
}
) )